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SYMPOSIUM 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND 
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: 
SEARCHING FOR THE 
RIGHT BALANCE 
INTRODUCTION: "ATROCIOUS JUDGES" 
AND "ODIOUS" COURTS REVISITED 
Robert N Strassfeldt 
In 1968 the Columbia Law Review published Robert Cover's re-
view of Richard Hildreth's book, Atrocious Judges: Lives of Judges 
Infamous as Tools of Tyrants and Instruments of Oppression, which 
Hildreth had published in 1856.1 Even by the standards of legal publi-
cation, the 112-year lag is remarkable. Of course, neither Cover's 
review, nor Hildreth's book were what they appeared to be at first 
glance. Hildreth picked among the biographies of English judges in 
Lord Campbell's Lives of the Chief Justices/ and selected the biogra-
phies of the most contemptible to republish in his collection. To this, 
Hildreth, already known as an antislavery publicist, appended the 
petitions and opinions in the case of Passmore Williamson, a Phila-
delphia abolitionist, who was jailed for contempt of court for his role 
in abetting the escape of a slave family in defiance of the Fugitive 
Slave Act. Hildreth's point was obviously not to relive the worst of 
English judicial history, but to draw the comparison between his se-
t Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. 
1 Robert M. Cover, Book Review, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1003 (1968) (reviewing RicHARD 
Hll.DRETH, ATROCIOUS JUDGES: LIVES OF JUDGES INFAMOUS AS TOOLS OF TYRANTS AND 
INSTRUMENTS OF OPPRESSION (1856)). 
2 There are several editions of Lord Campbell's book, published under slightly different 
titles. E.g. JOHN CAMPBELL, THE LivES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND (1873-1876). 
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lect assembly of servants of tyranny and an American judiciary that 
was nearly uniformly proslavery in its decisions. 
Like Hildreth, Cover was speaking to his times. "The federal judi-
ciary," Cover wrote, "has remained faithful to its long tradition as 
executors of immoral law. "3 No longer, of course, were the issues the 
Fugitive Slave Act and support for slavery. fustead, Cover con-
demned judges as accessories to tyranny through their enforcement of 
the selective service laws against draft resisters during the Vietnam 
War. Cover concluded with the thought that the blood of American 
soldiers is on the hands not only of the Johnson administration, but of 
those judges and prosecutors who vigorously enforced the draft laws.4 
Such attention to, and attacks on, the judiciary, especially the fed-
eral judiciary, recur throughout our history. In the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, for instance, Populists, Progressives and trade union-
ists all condemned the federal bench as the servant of wealth and 
capital. These critics condemned the courts, and especially the United 
States Supreme Court, for an array of decisions and approaches, in-
cluding the development of substantive due process jurisprudence, 
aggressive use of i~unctions against labor unions and state regulatory 
commissions, and a general bias against unions and consumers and in 
favor of big business. 5 Many of the criticisms sound familiar to the 
contemporary ear, though in modem times the criticism has more 
typically come from the other end of the political spectrum. Progres-
sives decried the lack of deference to the democratic branches of the 
federal government and to state governments, and they accused the 
courts of acting as super legislatures willing to read the personal 
predilections of judges into statutes in defiance of the legislative and 
popular will. 6 
Progressives attacked the courts as antidemocratic and counter-
majoritarian. fu 1912, New York lawyer, Gilbert Roe, condemned the 
'Judicial oligarchy" in a book bearing that title. 7 In his introduction to 
Roe's book, the Progressive Wisconsin Senator, Robert La Follette 
wrote: 
3 Cover, supra noie I, at 1005. 
4 !d. at 1008. 
5 EDWARD A PuRCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE 
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
AMERICA 11-16, 19-26 (2000); WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FuRY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, 
AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 10-21 passim (1994). 
6 Other criticisms, notably the accusations of class bias, do not have such clear modem 
echoes. 
7 GILBERT E. RoE, OUR JUDICIAL OLIGARCHY ( 1911 ). 
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Evidence abounds that, as constituted to-day, the courts per-
vert justice almost as often as they administer it. Precedent 
and procedure have combined to make one law for the rich 
and another for the poor. The regard of the courts for fossil-
ized precedent, their absorption in technicalities, their de-
tachment from the vital, living facts of the present day, their 
constant thinking on the side of the rich and powerful and 
privileged classes have brought our courts into conflict with 
the democratic spirit and purposes of this generation. More-
over, by usurping the power to declare statutes unconstitu-
tional and by presuming to read their own views into statutes 
without regard to the plain intention of the legislators, they 
have become in reality the supreme law-making and law-
giving institution of our government. They have taken to 
themselves a power it was never intended they should exer-
cise; a power greater than that entrusted to the courts of any 
other enlightened nation. And because this tremendous power 
has been so generally exercised on the side of the wealthy and 
powerful few, the courts have become at last the strongest 
bulwark of special privilege. 8 
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Roe and other critics, such as then-Professor Felix Frankfurter, ques-
tioned whether the Fourteenth Amendment should be repealed, given 
its transformation by the courts into an instrument for protecting 
business against regulation. 9 Charles Amidon, a Progressive federal 
judge from North Dalcota, simply pronounced that in their obstruction 
of reform the courts had become "odious."10 
Armed with this critique, Progressives and other critics of judicial 
conservatism sought to rein in the courts. La Follette captured this 
spirit in writing that, "neither courts nor their decisions can properly 
remain above and beyond the control of the sovereign citizens. Judges 
cannot perform their high function in the public interest unless they 
are made acquainted with public needs and are responsive to the pub-
lic will."11 Most of their efforts were unsuccessful, including Ne-
braska Senator Norris's proposal to abolish diversity jurisdiction and 
La Follette's proposal of a constitutional amendment providing for 
the election of federal judges and of another that would permit Con-
gress to reenact with a super-majority vote federal legislation that the 
8 Robert M. La Follette, Introduction to RoE, supra note 7, at vi-vii. 
9 Ross, supra note 5, at 66-67,291. 
to Charles F. Amidon to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Jan. 19, 1911, Holmes Papers, Box 
37, Folder 20, quoted in PURCELL, supra note 5, at 14. 
11 La Follette, supra note 8, at vi. 
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Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional. 12 Congressional critics 
did succeed in curbing the power of the federal courts to issue labor 
injunctions, with the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 13 These 
battles ultimately culminated in President Roosevelt's ill-conceived 
and unsuccessful court-packing plan. 
This symposium is the product of another moment of widespread 
criticism of the courts. That criticism appeared to come to a head in 
the final moments of the tragic drama revolving around Terry 
Schiavo, though it had been percolating for a long time before the 
Schiavo controversy. Those who rallied to the support of Schiavo's 
parents against her husband Michael's assertions regarding her wishes 
pertaining to heroic medical intervention to keep her alive attacked 
both the Florida state courts and the federal courts for their decisions 
in the case. Both Congress and the Florida state legislature, with the 
support of their respective Bush-brother Chief Executives, sought to 
advance the parents' position by undoing adverse court decisions. 
When, notwithstanding congressional intervention, Michael Schiavo 
prevailed in his effort to remove the feeding tube that was keeping his 
wife alive, congressional rhetoric became especially intemperate. 
House Speaker Tom DeLay threatened that the judges involved would 
be held to account, and spoke of imposing new limits on federal 
jurisdiction, while Texas Senator John Cornyn suggested that recent 
murders of judges and members of their families were somehow a 
response to "political decisions" rendered by an unaccountable 
judiciary. 14 Representative Steve King of Iowa reminded us of the 
power that Congress wields over the federal district courts, stating 
that Congress has "the constitutional authority to eliminate any and 
all inferior courts," and threatening impeachment of noncompliant 
judges.15 Oklahoma Senator Tom Coburn's Chief of Staff, Michael 
Schwartz, suggested the possibility of "mass impeachment." 16 
As the examples of the Schiavo controversy and the Progressive 
critique of the judiciary show, calls for greater "accountability" or for 
preserving "independence" are products of their times. Much of the 
1z PURCELL, supra note 5, at 77-85; Ross, supra note 5, at 193-217, 254-84. 
13 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 101-15 (LexisNexis 2006); see PURCELL, supra note 5, at 85-91. 
14 Charles Babington, Senator Links Violence to "Political" Decisions, WASH. POST, Apr. 
5, 2005, at A07; Charles Babington, GOP Is Fracturing Over Power of Judiciary, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 7, 2005, at A04 [hereinafter Babington, GOP Is Fracturing]; Carl Hulse & David D. 
Kirkpatrick, DeLay Says Federal Judiciary Has "Run Amok," Adding Congress Is Partly To 
Blame, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 2005, §A, at 21; Cynthia Tucker, Fiery Rhetoric Could Explode, 
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 10, 2005, at F6. 
15 Babington, GOP Is Fracturing, supra note 14. 
16 Hulse & Kirkpatrick, supra note 14. To be sure, to date Congress has not acted on these 
threats and the rhetoric has sinunered down. 
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discussion is driven by dissatisfaction with the current direction of the 
courts, often focused on a small number of decisions, albeit ones that 
have a powerful political resonance. Like La Follette before him, 
Judge Robert Bork has advocated a constitutional amendment allow-
ing Congress to overrule Supreme Court declarations of a statute's 
unconstitutionality, yet it is hard to imagine the two of them agreeing 
on much regarding the performance of the courts. 17 Similarly, long 
before Congressman King's musings about abolishing the inferior 
federal courts, Progressive Nebraska Senator, George Norris, pro-
posed the idea. 18 
Stripped of their context, the concepts of independence and ac-
countability may be hollow and uninformative. Part of the problem is 
that both terms are relational. They only make sense in reference to 
something outside of the judiciary. To whom, or what, do we want 
judges to be accountable? Obvious, but very different possibilities 
include, the political branches, the popular will, the Constitution (not 
that we can agree on what fealty to the Constitution looks like) or a 
tradition of reasoned elaboration and commitment to precedent. From 
whom, or what, do we want them to be independent? Does independ-
ence mean that courts are dangerously poised to thwart the democ-
ratic will as their Progressive critics thought? Conversely, since the 
judiciary, especially where judges are not elected, is most immune 
from the growing sway of private power, has its independence be-
come more important than ever? 19 
Wisely, the editors of the Case Western Reserve Law Review, in 
organizing this symposium quickly decided to look beyond the im-
mediate debate over the Schiavo case and legislation. Instead, they 
invited scholars who go beyond the well-trodden controversies re-
garding judicial independence and accountability. While each partici-
pant obviously has his or her political commitments, the articles and 
responses that follow evince an effort to reach beyond the passions of 
the moment in order to say something more enduring about the rela-
tionship between the courts and the other branches of government. 
As noted above, much of the discussion regarding the judiciary has 
consisted of little more than political sloganeering. Professor Charles 
17 ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND 
AMERlCAN DECLINE 117-18 (1996). Judge Bork's proposal, actually goes well beyond La 
Follette's. It would make "any federal or state court decision subject to being overruled by a 
majority vote of each House of Congress." !d. at 117. To be sure, in support of his proposal, he 
invokes La Follette. 
1s Ross, supra note 5, at 188. Norris understood, however, that his proposal had no pros-
pect for adoption, perhaps Congressman King did, as well. 
19 See James G. Wilson, Noam Chomsky and Judicial Review, 44 CLEV. Sr. L. REV. 439, 
442-444 (1996). 
904 CASE FVESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4 
Geyh20 notes that calls for judicial accountability have typically 
served as a shorthand for greater restriction on the jurisdictional reach 
or the power of the courts and that proponents have typically been 
those who are hostile to the substantive leanings, or perceived lean-
ings, of the courts. Those, in turn, who worry about the erosion of 
those substantive decisions tend to frame "accountability" and "inde-
pendence" as polar opposites and raise the banner of "independence." 
Geyh worries that such a mechanical invocation of "independence" in 
response to calls for "accountability" too quickly cedes the concept of 
accountability to the courts' critics. 
Professor Geyh attempts to rescue the discussion of accountability 
from political sloganeering by describing a typology of judicial ac-
countability. In so doing, he shows that much of what we might mean 
by accountability is noncontroversial. For instance, no one would 
suggest that it is proper for judges to have a financial interest in the 
outcome of their cases. The consensus about accountability breaks 
down, however, when it comes to accountability for "decisional er-
ror." Here, Professor Geyh distinguishes between inadvertent and 
deliberate decisional error and argues that only the latter should be 
sanctionable. Recognizing the difficulty of distinguishing intentional 
from unintentional error, he proposes to protect judges from perpetual 
harassment for unpopular decisions through a rebuttable presumption 
of good faith. 
Professors Susan Bandes21 and William Marshall22 applaud the 
usefulness and clarity of Geyh's typology. They question, however, 
whether Geyh's distinction between intentional, and therefore, sanc-
tionable decisional error, and unintentional nonsanctionable deci-
sional error is either appropriate or meaningful. Marshall points to a 
number of Supreme Court decisions that one might characterize as 
deliberate distortions of the law in order to achieve a greater good and 
asks whether we really think that the Justices in those instances ought 
to have been punished. Noting that what seems to distinguish inten-
tional from unintentional error in Geyh's analysis is decision-making 
based on political rather than legal grounds, they question whether a 
regime of sanctions based on that distinction is either operable or ju-
risprudentially defensible. The effort to separate law from politics 
was very much at the heart of nineteenth-century classical legal 
2° Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm of Political 
Rhetoric, 56 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 911 (2006). 
21 Susan Bandes, Judging, Politics, and Accountability: A Reply to Charles Geyh, 56 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 947 (2006). 
22 William P. Marshall, Judicial Accountability in a Time of Legal Realism, 56 CASE W. 
REs. L. REv. 937 (2006). 
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thought, but the notion that such a distinction is desirable and possible 
may not have survived legal realism. 23 
Dean Lisa Kloppenberg24 considers one practice that is ostensibly 
protective of judicial independence: the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance. She focuses specifically on the canon of statutory con-
stmction that calls for narrow constmction of a statute in order to 
avoid serious constitutional questions. 
This longstanding mle of constitutional avoidance is among those 
articulated by Justice Brandeis in his Ashwander concurrence. 
Brandeis expected the courts to show proper deference to Congress 
and state legislatures, by avoiding, where possible, invalidation of 
their legislation.25 In addition to showing proper respect for a coordi-
nate branch of government, the practice of avoidance by narrow statu-
tory constmction is thought to promote judicial independence by 
avoiding conflict, and therefore, congressional reprisal. Finally, the 
doctrine's adherents suggest that its observance will promote consti-
tutional dialogue among the branches, or with state governments. 
Dean Kloppenberg criticizes this doctrine and the rationales of-
fered for its support. Building on her prior work in the area, she ar-
gues that the doctrine disadvantages the poor and marginalized who 
generally lack access to influence the other branches. 26 She then turns 
to the claims that the doctrine protects judicial independence by 
avoiding unnecessary conflict with Congress or the states. She argues 
that in practice courts often employ the doctrine, not deferentially, but 
aggressively to rewrite, and distort, legislation and to engage in what 
amounts to constitutional decision-making on a subconstitutional 
level. She questions how effective these practices can be in fostering 
constitutional dialogue. Aclmowledging that courts sometimes should 
avoid difficult constitutional questions, she calls for a reversal of the 
presumption that currently favors avoidance. 
23 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, DIE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 
9-31 passim (1992); Wll..LIAM M. WIECEK, DIE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 
64-112 (1998). 
24 Lisa A Kloppenberg, Does Avoiding Constitutional Questions Promote Judicial inde-
pendence?, 56 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1031 (2006). 
25 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
26 LISA A KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS HARD 
CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW (2001); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious 
Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme Court's Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech 
Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1 (1996). 
906 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4 
Both Professor Melvyn Durchslag27 and Professor Michelle 
Slack28 agree that the avoidance doctrines can have perverse 
consequences and may disadvantage the politically vulnerable. They 
share with Dean Kloppenberg a skepticism about how deferential the 
courts have really been in practice and how effective the avoidance 
doctrines have been in dispelling interbranch rivalry. Nevertheless, 
each takes issue with aspects of her analysis. Professor Durchslag, 
who professes ambivalence about avoidance techniques, argues that 
avoidance is both an inevitable consequence of our system of divided 
government, and, in some instances, both advantageous and, perhaps, 
no greater a source of constitutional uncertainty than divided 
constitutional decisions. Professor Slack reaches the same conclusion 
as Dean Kloppenberg, that the presumption should disfavor avoiding 
serious constitutional questions through narrow, all too often, 
distorting, statutory construction, but she differs in how she reaches 
that conclusion. She notes that unlike such other avoidance 
techniques as abstention and justiciability doctrines, the doctrine of 
avoidance through narrow construction does not bar the court house 
door. Indeed, by assuming the likelihood of constitutional difficulty 
and construing the statute to avoid confronting that constitutional 
difficulty, the doctrine tends "to overprotect those alleging 
constitutional infringement," though without a clear statement of the 
constitutional right. 29 Thus, she faults the doctrine for tainting 
legislation with a presumption of unconstitutionality, thereby turning 
on its head the principal of statutory construction that statutes are 
entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. 
Professors Jonatlmn Entin and Erik Jensen30 venture where few 
constitutional and federal courts scholars dare go, into the realm of 
taxation. Specifically, they examine the purpose and application of 
the Compensation Clause, 31 which, along with the grant of life tenure, 
is how the Constitution expressly protects judicial independence. En-
tin and Jensen first consider the original understanding of the Com-
pensation Clause. They then examine the doctrinal history of the 
27 Melvyn R. Durchslag, The Inevitability (and Desirability?) of Avoidance: A Response 
to Dean Kloppenberg, 56 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1043 (2006). 
28 Michelle R. Slack, Avoiding Avoidance: Why Use of the Constitutional Avoidance 
Canon Undermines Judicial Independence-A Response to Lisa Kloppenberg, 56 CASE W. REs. 
L. REv. 1057 (2006). 
29 !d. at 1061. 
30 Jonathan L. Entin & Erik M. Jensen, Ta:ration, Compenstation, and Judicial Independ-
ence, 56 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 965 (2006). 
31 U.S. CONST. art. IlL § l. The clause says that "The Judges ... shall, at stated Times, re-
ceive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continu-
ance in Office." 
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clause, focusing most extensively on a series of twentieth-century 
cases that involved the taxation of Article III judges. This history 
culminated in the Court's 2001 decision, United States v. Hatter, 32 
which the authors assume, and hope, is the Court's last word on the 
topic. 
Retaliatory pay cuts, the scenario that the framers had in mind, are 
politically not a realistic threat. Rather, the Compensation Clause has 
been tested by instances where judges have been subjected to taxa-
tion. The question finally laid to rest in Hatter was whether Congress 
can extend a tax of general application to sitting judges, including 
judges who had previously been exempt from the tax. Professors En-
tin and Jensen argue that the Court correctly concluded that Congress 
may subject Article III judges to a tax of general application. 33 
Though they conclude that Hatter should be the end of the story, they 
see on the horizon an understanding of the Compensation Clause, that 
the framer's intent was not merely to protect judicial independence, 
but to guarantee that compensation was sufficient to ensure that the 
right sort of people could be recruited to become judges, which might 
revivify claims of the Compensation Clause as a check on taxation of 
judges. Such a reading of the Compensation Clause, they argue is 
neither supported by the original understanding of the framers, nor a 
sensible approach toward judicial recruitment. 
Professor Mark Miller34 is skeptical of claims that any Supreme 
Court ruling is necessarily the final word on a constitutional subject, 
and therefore, takes a small exception to Professors Entin's and 
Jensen's analysis. Generally agreeing with their argument, he turns 
instead to an examination of other means available to Congress to 
express its displeasure with or attempt to control the federal judiciary. 
At first blush, Professor Mark Tushnet35 appears to have returned 
us to the midst of current controversies, since he focuses on pending 
legislation, the Constitution Restoration Act of 2005. However, the 
Act's proponents introduced the bill with little expectation of 
enactment, and Professor Tushnet chooses to focus on the more 
32 532 u.s. 557 (2001). 
33 They criticize, however, one part of the decision. The Court had to decide whether cer-
tain Social Security taxes could be extended to previously exempt federal judges. The Court 
held that extension of the Medicare tax was permissible, but that the extension of the Old Age, 
Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) tax was impermissible because the removal of that 
exemption was discriminatory. Entin and Jensen fmd tlus latter conclusion to be flawed. 
34 Mark C. Miller, When Congress Attacks the Federal Courts, 56 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 
1015 (2006). 
35 Mark Tushnet, The "Constitution Restoration Act" and Judicial Independence: Some 
Observations, 56 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1071 (2006). 
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obscure provisions of the bill. 36 Specifically, the Constitution 
Restoration Act would bar a court from relying on any foreign law, 
"other than English constitutional and comtnon law up to the time of 
the adoption of the Constitution of the United States" when 
interpreting or applying the United States Constitution. Further, it 
deems violation of this provision an impeachable offense. 37 Thus an 
unlilcely vehicle for discussion, a bill with no real prospect for 
passage, becomes an opportunity to explore the limits of permissible 
congressional interference with the operation of federal courts and the 
permissible grounds for impeachment. 
Before considering these questions, Professor Tushnet briefly 
examines some of the difficulties posed by the bill on its own terms. 
What would constitute reliance on foreign law? How would we 
necessarily know if judges did so rely, unless they told us? Turning to 
his principal questions, Tushnet first asks whether Congress has the 
power to limit the sources of law relied upon for constitutional 
interpretation. The problem here is United States v. Klein,38 which 
prohibits congressional interference with the courts' rules of decision. 
Professor Tushnet argues that the Klein problem really involves a 
continuum of greater and lesser degrees of congressional interference 
with judicial interpretive methods, and, though he acknowledges that 
it would be a close case, he concludes that the Constitution 
Restoration Act would pass muster under a Klein analysis. Tuming to 
the Act's impeachment provision, Tushnet ponders whether the Act 
provides a sufficient "legal" basis for impeachment, to permit 
Congress, if it were unhappy with a particular judge's reliance on 
foreign law in her decision-making, to impeach and remove that judge 
for more than mere political disagreement with how she had decided a 
case. Again he concludes that the Act would pass constitutional 
muster. 
36 He chooses not to focus on the jurisdiction stripping provisions of the bill, which would 
take him back onto the well -beaten path of federal courts scholarship. 
37 The bill is obviously in response to a number of recent Supreme Court decisions that 
have discussed foreign law in their analysis, whether or not the Court ultimately relied on that 
law. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 n.2l (2002) (holding execution of the men-
tally retarded unconstitutional); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003) (declaring 
Texas sodomy statute prohibiting c·· .. --:.,sua~ adult, sexual activity amongst same-sex partners 
unconstitutional); Roper v. Simmons, 54J U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005) (prohibiting application of 
death penalty to those who were under eighteen at the time of the offense). The apparent reli-
ance on foreign law has drawn criticism both from within the Court and without. See, e.g., id. at 
608, 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting), Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Inter-
pret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (2004); Steven G. Calabresi & David C. Presser, 
Reintroducing Circuit Riding a Timely Proposal, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1386, 1388 (2006) (propos-
ing, with tongue only partly in cheek, reintroduction of circuit riding for Supreme Court justices 
during the summer "to rein in the Justices' transatlantic legal dalliances"). 
38 80 u.s. 128 (1871). 
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In response, Professor Ronald Kahn39 asks why Professor Tushnet 
appears to think that enactment of the Constitution Restoration Act 
would have little consequence. Professor Kahn situates Tushnet's 
analysis within a larger body ofTushnet's work, his recent writing on 
"popular constitutionalism. "40 He criticizes, Tushnet' s analysis of the 
Act, along with his theory of popular constitutionalism more gener-
ally as m1dervaluing the distinct role of courts and the Supreme Court 
and consequently in undervaluing judicial independence in favor of 
the political branches. 
39 Ronald Kahn, The Constitution Restoration Act, Judicial Independence, and Popular 
Constitutionalism, 56 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1083 (2006). 
40 MARK TUSHNET, TAKING TilE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM TilE COURTS (1999). 
